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THE UNMET CHALLENGE OF CRIMINAL
THEORY
George P. Fletchert
The last several decades have witnessed an outpouring of serious
articles bringing to bear the methods of analytic philosophy to the
issues of substantive criminal law. J. L. Austin,1 a philosopher and
not a lawyer, may have been the first to demonstrate the potential of
probing legal concepts such as mistake and accident, justification
and excuse, for their philosophical potential. H.L.A. Hart carried
forward the literature with several path breaking essays on criminal
law. 2 It is only in the last few years, however, that we have encountered an explosion of interest in the basic questions of criminal law.
As the essays in this volume, as well as other works in progress,
demonstrate, we now have a critical mass of scholars interested in
the philosophical dimensions of punishment, self-defense, justification, excuse, omissions, and causation.
Yet, for all this impressive growth in the literature, an important challenge remains unmet. The discussion of justification and excuse proceeds without adequately appreciating the theoretical matrix
in which these questions arise. True, in his Article in this symposium, Dressler recognizes that claims of justification negate the affirmative requirement of wrongful conduct3 and excuses negate the
requirement of culpability.4 But neither wrongful conduct nor culpability is related to an overall theory on the structure of criminal conduct. What is the connection between the conventional requirements
of mens rea and actus reus and the newly discovered requirement
that liability presupposes disproof of claims both of justification and

t Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1960, University of California
at Berkeley; J.D. 1963; M.C.L. 1965, University of Chicago.
I. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'v I (1956-57).
2. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
3. See Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts
and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1161-63 nn.19-22 (1987). He also
says, however, that claims of justifications negate "the social harm of an offense."
That is not so clear. If, for example, the actor maliciously uses force against an
aggressor without knowing the latter to be an aggressor, he would not be able to
invoke the justification of self-defense, but he arguably would have realized the social harm of stopping an aggressor. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
552-68 ( 1978).
4. Dressler, supra note 3, at 1163.
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excuse? From a reading of the current American literature, one
would be hard pressed to answer this question.
What is lacking in the American discussion of these issues is a
general theory of the elements that constitute punishable criminal
conduct. This theory is called the Verbrechenslehre in the German
literature, a term that is generally translated as "theory of crime."
The problem is that this term invariably invokes sociological associations. We think of a theory about the origins and genesis of crime.
What in fact German theorists have in mind, rather, is a theory
about the nature of punishable crime. What can be said about the
structure of criminal conduct beyond noting the obvious that crime
consists of antisocial conduct or conduct prohibited by the legislature? I take this question to be about a philosophical rather than a
sociological theory of crime.
The absence of philosophical theory of crime becomes apparent
when we ask this simple question: What do we call the case that the
· prosecution must prove before the defensive issues of justification
and excuse become relevant? This is the set of issues that we have in
mind when we define a crime. Blackstone took the core of homicide
to be "causing death to another," every other issue was a matter of
justification, excuse or alleviation (mitigation)." The definition of
larceny that finally crystallized in the common law was, roughly,
"taking the property of another with the intent permanently to deprive the owner thereof." 6 Note that sometimes the conventional definition includes intent and sometimes not.
Any of the following expressions might be appropriate to capture the elements that the prosecution must prove: Prima facie case,
elements of the offense, prohibited act, criminal act or actus reus.
Each of these terms is problematic. "Prima facie" has an evidentiary
rather than a substantive connotation; the term refers to a level of
proof rather than a conceptual dimension of crime. "Elements of the
offense" might do the job, except that the Model Penal Code has
defined the term to include the absence of claims of justification and
excuse.7 Indeed, it is not so clear why a claim of justification is not a
negative element as other requirements are positive elements of the
offense. The terms "prohibited" and "criminal" both suffer from the
same ambiguity. Justified acts are neither prohibited nor criminal. If
the terms "prohibited" and "criminal" claim too much for our purposes, the Latin standby actus reus tells us too little. The "elusive
dimension" of criminal conduct that we are trying to identify might
well include criteria of intention and negligence, thus implying that
5.
6.
105 Cal.
7.

4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201.
Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, ch. 50, § l; see also People v. Brown,
66, 38 P. 518 (1894).
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 1.13(9) {Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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the mens rea is included as well as the actus reus. It is hard to believe that we have neither a recognized term for this "elusive dimension," nor any theoretical clarification for the nature and structure
of this dimension of criminal liability. For this is the concept that is
implicated in the Supreme Court cases from In Re Winship 8 to Martin v. Ohio, 9 decided in the current term. Everyone agrees that the
prosecution must prove some set of issues beyond a reasonable doubt,
but there is no term of art that clearly demarcates the undisputed
core of the prosecution's case. Winship holds that the prosecutorial
duty of proof extends to "every fact necessary to constitute the crime
. . . charged." 10 But this formula hardly helps us unless we know
which elements are included within the notion of "crime." Interpreting this standard laid down in Winship, the majority in Martin concluded that self-defense was not part of the "crime charged." Apparently, the state legislature and courts can determine the "elements of
the offense" that the prosecution must prove. 11 Ohio had decided
that murder consisted only of three elements. 12 And that, then, was
the crime charged. There was nothing constitutionally untoward
about requiring the state to prove only these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The constitutional standard proposed in Winship will obviously
remain vacuous unless some basic theoretical work is forthcoming on
the elements that should constitute the prosecution's case. Suppose
that a state returned to the common law rule that in homicide cases,
the defense must proof accident and mistake. 13 The issues of intention and negligence are merely the converse of mistake and accident.
If the defense must prove mistake, it must disprove knowledge and
intention; if it must prove (faultless) accident, it bears the burden on
the issue of negligence. Under Martin there is no reason why a state
could not tinker in this way with its rules of proof. The only barrier
that could possibly stand in the way would be a conceptual argument
about the issues that properly belong to the prosecution's charge.
8. 397 U.S. 358 (I 970) (holding unconstitutional juvenile court statute permitting prosecution to prevail on "clear and convincing evidence").
9. I 07 S. Ct. I 098 ( I 987) (holding, five to four, that state may constitutionally require defendant to prove self-defense by preponderance of the evidence). The
other important cases in the series are Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 ( 1977)
(holding that state may constitutionally define "extreme emotional distress" as an
affirmative defense that does not negate any element of murder, and impose burden
of persuasion on defendant); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding
unconstitutional state statute requiring defendant to prove provocation when it negates malice required for murder).
10. 397 U.S. at 364.
11. 107 S. Ct. at 1103.
12. Id. (causing death, purposely, and with "prior calculation and design").
13. See 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201.
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Not only do we not have the argument; we do not even have a concept that can capture the set of issues at stake.
One thing we can say about the dimension of criminal liability
that eludes us is that it is incriminating in nature. By contrast,
claims of justification and excuse are exculpatory. This distinction in
evaluative charge helps us little, for as is well known, the absence of
exculpatory issues can be restated as incriminating elements. Is it
self-defense that exculpates or the absence of self-defense that
incriminates?
Perhaps this overstates the problem. We intuitively grasp that
self-defense is a justification. And we are not inclined to think the
same way about the claim that the defendant's shot was not the one
that killed the victim. Denying a causal connection does not exculpate the actor in the same way that a justification does. There is
probably no better way to express it than to invoke distinctions from
the common law of pleading. While denying the causal connection
between actor and harm concedes nothing, a claim of justification is
a plea in "confession and avoidance." The justification concedes the
incriminating dimension of the act asserted by the prosecution, and
argues that, nonetheless, the act is not wrongful or criminal. Excuses
are also claims in "confession and avoidance." The assertion of the
excuse concedes that the act is unjustified and criminal, but argues,
nonetheless, that the actor should not be held accountable. There
are, then, some clear differences between claims that deny the prosecution's case and claims that, by their nature, function as claims of
justification and excuse. 14
If the "elusive dimension" of crime consists of incriminating
acts, we can hardly avoid the question: What makes these acts incriminating? Surely, it is relevant that the legislature has prohibited
the acts in question. But are acts incriminating because the legislature has prohibited them, or has the legislature prohibited them because they are incriminating? Because we assume legislative
supremacy in the criminal law, we are inclined to think that acts are
incriminating for no reason other than running afoul of legislative
prohibitions. This is what we might call the "positivist" version of
incrimination; it is only because an authoritative body has spoken
that we know acts are incriminating. The alternative "naturalist" approach to the problem holds that acts we want to regard as criminal
are, by their nature, incriminating. They are, as criminal lawyers
were once wont to say, ma/um in se-wrong in themselves. 111
14. There are admittedly some borderline issues. A good example is consent
in cases of assault and rape. Is nonconsent an element of the prosecution's case or is
consent a claim of justification? For the consequences of treating the issue one way
or the other, see G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 699-706.
15. The positivist view of incrimination is captured by the alternative expres-
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I am inclined to think there is more to the naturalist theory of
incrimination than modern lawyers are willing to assume. Significantly, claims of justification and excuse have to be seen as having a
naturalist foundation. No one would argue that self-defense is exculpatory just because the legislature says it is. And the defense of necessity or lesser evils has found its way into modern criminal codes
precisely because the academic community has insisted that the defense is right as a matter of principle. Claims of excuse speak to our
sense of justice and compassion. We cannot countenance punishing
those who do not have a fair opportunity to conform their behavior
to what is expected of them. 16 Of course, legislatures seek to capture
claims of justification and excuse in legal language. But the impulse
behind these provisions lies in our sense that it is wrong to punish in
the face of these exculpatory considerations. The problem, then, is
whether, in one system of thought, one can wed a naturalist theory
of exculpation with a positivist theory of inculpation. The former is
substantive (what is right and just) and the latter is purely formal
(inconsistency with legislative command). I am inclined to think that
the two cannot mesh. It is like attempting to argue against history
with logic or against valid inferences from accepted premises with
claims of truth. Accordingly, it is difficult to coordinate our system
of justification and excuse with purely regulatory offenses; acts that
are admittedly incriminating only because prohibited. The entire system of justification and excuse fits naturally with offenses as to
which we can say that legislation describes but does not constitute
the offense.
Of course, it is difficult to accept the naturalist theory of incrimination, for we are so accustomed to thinking that legislatures
must be supreme in defining criminal offenses. There is inconsistency, however, between recognizing the naturalist basis for our understanding of homicide, rape, larceny, burglary and other core offenses, and yet acknowledging that the legislature must specify the
contours of the offenses in borderline situations.
The unmet challenge of criminal theory consists in working out
the basis of the incriminating dimension of crime and relating this
incriminating dimension to the exculpatory dimension of justification
and excuse. One of the issues that must be confronted is whether
intent and negligence are always part of the incriminating dimension, or can we say sometimes, as Blackstone held in homicide cases,
that the converse elements-accident and mistakes-function as
sion ma/um prohibitum - wrong only because prohibited. For a skeptical approach
to this distinction, see G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LA w 936 (2d ed.
1983).
16. This is Hart's argument for excuses in H.L.A. HART, supra note 2, at 1724.
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claims of excuse? This question taxed postwar German theorists for
more than a generation, but they seem to have turned away from it,
without having resolved it. 17 There is no doubt this and other questions in the theory of crime pose problems that do not lend themselves to a ready consensus. But then this is only proof that we are in
the presence of genuine philosophical problems.

17.

For a discussion of the debate, see G.

FLETCHER,

supra note 3, at 476-81.

